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David Horton*
Commentary on Naomi Cahn, ProbateMeets the Digital Agel
I. INTRODUCTION

The story has become all too familiar. Someone dies, and her
loved ones request the contents of her text, email, or social media
accounts. Perhaps they wish to preserve this vibrant electronic slice of
the decedent's life. 2 Perhaps grief compels them to sift through the
minutiae of the decedent's final days. 3 Or perhaps they are merely
trying to fulfill their duties as trustees, executors, or administrators to
pay the decedent's bills and to inventory her property. However, the
decedent's Internet Service Provider ("ISP")-be it Facebook, Yahoo!,
or Microsoft-refuses to cooperate.

*
Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law (King Hall). Thanks to
Naomi Cahn for helpful comments.
1.
Naomi Cahn, Probate Law Meets the Digital Age: Harmonizing Federal Law With State
Wealth Transfer Law on Digital Assets, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1697 (2014).

2.

See, e.g., Paresh Dave, Grieving Dad Gets Look Back' Video for Dead Son From

Facebook, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/07/nation/a-na-nnfacebook-dead-son-20140207, archived at http://perma.cc/FUD3-8NBK (recounting a father's
struggle to obtain a copy of a video of his deceased son from Facebook).

3.

See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Fowler, Life and Death Online: Who Controls a Digital Legacy,

WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
5,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887324677204578188220364231346 (describing how a family was able to learn
more about their daughter's death by accessing her social media accounts).
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As Naomi Cahn explains in her outstanding contribution to the
Vanderbilt Law Review's Symposium on the Role of Federal Law in
Private Wealth Transfer,4 these ISPs are concerned about a byzantine
federal statute from 1986: the Stored Communications Act ("SCA").
Section 2701 of the SCA criminalizes unauthorized access to electronic
communications,5 presenting a seemingly nasty glitch for fiduciaries
attempting to marshal a decedent's digital assets. Section 2702 bars
ISPs from disclosing a customer's private data without her "lawful
consent."6 Noting that the SCA predates the rise of email-let alone
the phenomenon of a valuable Twitter account-Professor Cahn
argues that the statute should not govern fiduciaries. 7 Alternatively,
assuming that the SCA does apply in the trusts and estates context,
Professor Cahn discusses various ways around this obstacle, including
the Uniform Law Commission's draft Fiduciary Access to Digital
Assets Act ("FADA"), which would clarify that fiduciaries generally
enjoy the "authorization"' and "lawful consent" necessary to acquire a
decedent's online accounts.8
This short invited reply takes a different route to the same
destination. It begins by offering a reading of the SCA that diverges
slightly from Professor Cahn's. However, it uses that discussion to
echo her critique of the SCA and bolster the case for the FADA.
II. THE SCA
The SCA is dusty and complex, and courts commonly disagree
about the meaning of its key terms. Thus, although many
commentators have noted that the statute "may" cast a shadow over
the inheritability of digital assets, few have attempted to define its
precise effect.9 Professor Cahn deserves credit for filling this gap. As I
4.

See Cahn, supranote 1.

5.
6.

18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
Id. at § 2702(a)(1)-(2).

7.
See Cahn, supra note 1, at 1717-18 (arguing that the statute should not govern
fiduciaries).
8.

See id. at 21-24; UNIF. LAW COMM'N, FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT

("FADA") (2014), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/ Fiduciary% 20Access %20
to%20Digital%20Assets/2014marFADAMtg%/ 20Draft.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K9Q5UTNH (last visited May 7, 2014).
9.
Sandi S. Varnado, Your Digital Footprint at Death: An Illustration of Technology
Leaving the Law Behind, 74 LA. L. REV. 719, 749 (2014); see also James D. Lamm et al., The
Digital Death Conundrum: How Federal and State Laws Prevent FiduciariesFrom Managing
Digital Property, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385, 404 (2014) (noting that "case law provides no clear
answer regarding whether a fiduciary can provide 'lawful consent' to a service provider");
Kristina Sherry, Comment, What Happens to Our Facebook Accounts When We Die?: Probate
Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-MediaAssets Postmortem, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 211 (2012)

2014]

THE SCA AND DIGITAL ASSETS

1731

discuss next, I partially agree with her claim that the SCA is less of a
roadblock than commonly believed.

A. Section 2701
For fiduciaries, the most intimidating part of the SCA is
section 2701. That provision levies criminal penalties upon anyone
who "intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through
which an electronic communication service is provided" or who
"exceeds an authorization to access ... and thereby obtains, alters, or
prevents authorized access to a[n] . . . electronic communication while

it is in electronic storage."10 Congress intended this language to create
a weapon against "computer hackers (e.g., electronic trespassers).""
But because the statutory text sweeps broadly and prohibits simply
"logging onto another's email account without permission," 12 scholars
have voiced concern that fiduciaries may violate the SCA by taking
control of a decedent's electronic assets. 13
However, I share Professor Cahn's view that section 2701 does
not apply to fiduciaries. For starters, the passage's key phrase"without authorization"-is exceedingly narrow. "Authorization"
means "power granted by authority," as several courts have recognized
while interpreting the SCA's sister statute, the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act ("CFAA"). 14 As a result, a decedent whose will or trust
expressly allows a fiduciary to control her electronic possessions
automatically authorizes access to those assets under section 2701.
To be sure, because few estate plans actually mention digital
assets, the breadth of the term "authorization" does not get us very
far. What happens when a decedent executes a testamentary
instrument that is less specific? Does the bare act of naming an
executor or trustee-arming someone with the generalized right to
(explaining that the SCA "may inhibit the probate process"); Molly Wilkens, Note, Privacy and
Security During Life, Access After Death: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, 62 HASTINGS. L.J. 1037,
1053 (2011) (noting that the SCA is "unclear" and "leave[s] questions of access after death largely
unanswered").
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
11.
Lasco Foods, Inc. v. Hall and Shaw Sales, Mktg., & Consulting, LLC, 600 F. Supp. 2d
1045, 1049 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
12. See Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 (M.D. Tenn. 2008)
(noting that the statute prohibits logging on to another's computer but does not prohibit the use
of information gained without permission).
13. See Lamm, supra note 9, at 399-402 (explaining that fiduciaries risk criminal liability
for logging onto and managing a decedent's digital account under the CFAA, a statute similar to
the SCA with a similarly broad scope and discussed infra text accompanying note 13).
14. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting RANDOM
HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 139 (2d ed. 2001)).
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manage property-count as authorization to handle online accounts?
What about intestacy, where a decedent has done nothing to make her
wishes known?
For several reasons, I believe that fiduciaries in these contexts
also enjoy authorization. First, section 2701's common law roots
support this reading. As the Fourth Circuit has observed, Congress
modeled section 2701 on the venerable doctrine of trespass to
chattels. 15 A cause of action for trespass to chattels arises when a
defendant damages an item or dispossesses its owner of it.16 Of course,
fiduciaries are nothing like these third-party tortfeasors. A fiduciary
"steps into the decedent's shoes"17 and wields "the same power over
the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would
have." 18 Acting on the decedent's behalf-e ssentially acting as the
decedent-a fiduciary can sell property, pay debts, settle claims,
manage businesses,19 and waive the attorney-client privilege. 20 It
would be bizarre if a fiduciary, cloaked with this robust authority,
committed a trespass-like offense simply by logging on to a decedent's
accounts. Second, it need not be the decedent who authorizes access.
Indeed, one only lacks authorization when one acts "without any
permission."2 1 As a result, authorization can arise from any legitimate
conferral of rights, such as a probate court order giving an executor or
administrator dominion over the estate.
Here I must add an asterisk. Some ISP terms of service ("TOS")
prohibit users from transferring their accounts to others. 22 One might
argue that this restrictive boilerplate makes fiduciary access
unauthorized. However, I am not persuaded that TOS should affect
the authorization analysis. 23 Such a reading would allow fine print to

15. See Van Alstyne v. Elec. Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199, 208 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting
that the SCA "closely mirrors" the doctrine of trespass to chattels); cf. Theofel v. Farey-Jones,
359 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2004) (construing § 2701 in light of the doctrine of trespass to
land).
16.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 218(b)-(c)

(1965).

17.
People v. Jessee, 165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 280, 286 (Ct. App. 2013).
18. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-711 (2010).
19. Id. at § 3-715.
20. See, e.g., In re DelGatto, 950 N.Y.S.2d 738 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (stating that the
fiduciary waived the attorney-client privilege by challenging the validity of the trust and related
documents).
21.
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis
added).
22.
See, e.g., David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 567 (2014) (explaining
restraints on a user's right to transfer).
23. Of course, fine print that denies decedents the right to convey electronic assets may not
be valid under black-letter contract law. See, e.g., Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 612-
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define the scope of criminal liability. In turn, this would be perverse:
indeed, "the mere breach of a contract is not 'unlawful' in a criminal
sense." 24 This is particularly true for TOS: "private policies that are
lengthy, opaque, subject to change and seldom read."2 5
Finally, even if courts interpret authorization narrowly, section
2701 is limited in several respects. For one, the provision governs
unauthorized access to "a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided." 26 As several courts have
recognized, a facility is an ISP's server-not an individual's personal
computer, smart phone, or tablet. 27 Thus, if section 2701 does govern
fiduciaries, it does not prevent them from acquiring assets from a
decedent's hard drive or handheld device, such as photographs on an
iPad or downloaded email attachments on a personal computer. Also,
because section 2701 only forbids the access of data that is in
"electronic storage," 28 it should not cover a broad category of emails:
those that have already been read. Congress defined "electronic
storage" as "(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or
electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission
thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication." 29 An unopened message in a recipient's in-box is "in
'temporary, intermediate storage.' "30 Likewise, ISPs often clone their
13 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (refusing to enforce forum selection clause in browsewrap contract in
dispute over indescendibility provision in Yahoo!'s TOS).
24. In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 557-60 (N.D. Tex. 2005)
(discussing section 2702).
25. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (discussing the
analogous context of the CFAA); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 464 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(reasoning that construing the CFAA to cover a defendant's breach of TOS would violate the
void-for-vagueness doctrine); see also Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1582 (2010) ("[N]o one actually treats TOS as if they
govern access rights.").
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1) (2012).
27.
See, e.g., Garcia v. City of Laredo, Tex., 702 F.3d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he
statute envisions a provider (the ISP or other network service provider) and a user (the
individual with an account with the provider), with the user's communications in the possession
of the provider." (quoting Orin S. Kerr, infra note 30, at 1215)); United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d
1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003); In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1057-58 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (stating that a mobile device is not a "facility" within the statute); Council on Am.Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 793 F. Supp. 2d 311, 337 (D.D.C. 2011)
(stating that a personal computer is not a "server"); Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness
Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2701.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1)).
30. Rene v. G.F. Fishers, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1096 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (citing Crispin v.
Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 965, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(17)(A))).
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servers as a fail-safe against equipment failure, thus generating
duplicate emails that are kept "for backup purposes." 31 Conversely,
once opened by recipients, emails are neither awaiting delivery (stored
"temporar[ily]") nor copies preserved out of the ISP's abundance of
caution. 32 Accordingly, fiduciaries should be able to click through a
decedent's previously opened digital correspondence in much the same
way they can sift through conventional letters.
In sum, section 2701 should not govern fiduciary access to a
decedent's digital assets. But even if the provision does apply, it is
riddled with holes. Decedents can exempt particular items by
downloading them onto their personal computer or handheld device.
Even simply clicking on an email should be enough to liberate it from
the confines of section 2701.

B. Section 2702
Unfortunately, section 2702 is more problematic. That
provision bars certain ISPs from disclosing the contents of digital
accounts-such as emails, instant messages, or images-without the
user's "lawful consent." 33 What is lawful consent? Professor Cahn and
I agree that a decedent who drafts a testamentary instrument that
explicitly allows her fiduciary to manage electronic assets has
consented to disclosure. Similarly, customers should be able to take
other steps that waive section 2702's protections. For instance, the
31.
Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1216-18 & n.61 (2004).
32. See, e.g., Roadlink Workforce Solutions, L.L.C. v. Malpass, No. 3:13-cv-05459-RBL,
2013 WL 5274812, at *4, (W.D. Wash. Sept. 18, 2013) (stating that emails that are "opened but
not deleted" are not in storage); Lazette v. Kulmatycki, 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 758 (N.D. Ohio
2013) ("[E]-mails which the intended recipient has opened, but not deleted (and thus which
remain available for later re-opening) are not being kept 'for the purposes of backup protection.'"
(citation omitted)); Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (indicating that once emails are opened, they
are not awaiting delivery); United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773 (C.D. Ill. 2009)
(noting that the drafters of the statute intended to cover emails opened but left in the server);
Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 2012) (holding that emails that have been
opened but left on the server are not in electronic storage). Admittedly, there is contrary
authority. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[P]rior access is
irrelevant to whether the messages at issue were in electronic storage."); Cheng v. Romo, No.
Civ. A. 11-10007-DJC, 2013 WL 6814691, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 2013) (concluding same). But
see Kerr, supranote 31, at 1217 & n.61 (explaining why this conclusion is "implausible").
33.
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3). Section 2702 does not apply to all ISPs. Instead, it only governs
firms that offer services "to the public." Id. § 2702(a)(1)-(2); see also Andersen Consulting LLP v.
UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042-43 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (stating that defendants would be liable if they
knowingly divulged information to the public). Because most commercial ISPs and social media
sites are open to any willing customer, they are open "to the public" and therefore must contend
with § 2702. However, educational and work-related email systems "are available only to users
with special relationships with the provider." Kerr, supra note 31, at 1226.
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House Report on the SCA emphasizes that users can satisfy the
consent element by signing up for an ISP that permits disclosure:
If conditions governing disclosure or use are spelled out in the rules of an electronic
communication service, and those rules are available to users or in contracts for the
provision of such services, it would be appropriate to imply consent on the part of a user
to disclosures or uses consistent with those rules. 3 4

Finally, customers can arguably consent in relatively casual ways. The
legislative history also notes that "consent ... need not take the form
of a formal written document" and may flow from "action that
evidences

acquiescence

to .

.

. disclosure or use." 35 Although this

language is somewhat vague, it could extend to a situation in which
an individual simply tells someone else that she wishes to convey her
online accounts after she dies.
Nevertheless, decedents who do not fall into one of these camps
probably have not consented to disclosure. Here I part ways with
Professor Cahn, who construes consent and authorization as
synonymous. 36 In my eyes, the critical difference is this: unlike
authorization under section 2701, which a probate court can give,
consent under section 2702 must stem from the user. Indeed,
definitions of consent focus on the consenting party's "[a]greement,
approval, or permission as to some act or purpose." 37 Suppose a person
neither signs up for an ISP that allows disclosure nor makes her
wishes known, and then dies without a testamentary instrument that
mentions digital assets. In the whistling silence of this scenario, no
words or conduct give the ISP the green light to release the decedent's
stored communications. True, consent is one of the slipperiest concepts
in law and can be constructive or implied. Also, by making a will or
trust, an owner passes the torch to her executor or trustee to manage
her property after she dies. Likewise, even intestacy can represent a
quasi-consensual state of affairs where, in lieu of creating an estate
plan, a decedent "selects" a jurisdiction's off-the-rack distribution
scheme. Yet the illustrations of consent in the SCA's legislative
history involve affirmative conduct: forming a contract or making a
statement that specifically bears on disclosure. 38
34. H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 66 (1986).
35. Id.
36. See Cahn, supra note 1, at 1717-18 (arguing that the statute should not govern
fiduciaries).
37. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (9th ed. 2009).
38. There is a slightly stronger argument that fiduciaries can consent on behalf of a
decedent for emails that a decedent has received, rather than written. Section 2702(b)(1) permits
ISPs to disclose correspondence for which a user is an "addressee or intended recipient" to her
"agent." If fiduciaries are a decedents' "agent[s]," then § 2702 does not govern messages sent by
others to decedents.

1736

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:6:1729

Moreover, TOS have more bite under section 2702 than they do
under section 2701. First, these provisions may allow section 2702 to
override a decedent's attempt to convey digital assets. Suppose a
customer signs a will that expressly leaves the contents of her email
account to her spouse, but her ISP's TOS forbids posthumous
conveyance. There is a plausible argument that she has consented, but
is not acting lawfully. Admittedly, some authority suggests that
simply breaching a contract "is not unlawful." 39 But at the same time,
"[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of 'lawful' is that which is
permitted by law,' "40 and flouting a binding agreement does not seem
to meet that standard. Also, allowing TOS to define authorization
under section 2701 predicates criminal sanctions on a user's disregard
of inconspicuous print, to rather harsh effect.4 1 But because section
2702 only creates civil liability, no such concerns are present. Second,
even if restrictive TOS do not affect section 2702's scope, they are a
separate and independent basis for ISPs to resist disclosure. Section
2702 is a one-way street. If it governs, ISPs cannot release a
subscriber's electronic correspondence. However, if section 2702 does
not apply, the statute merely permits-but does mandatedisclosure. 42 Accordingly, a fiduciary seeking electronic property in the
teeth of TOS must not only overcome section 2702 but also convince a
court that the noninheritability clause is invalid under black-letter
contract law.
To summarize, section 2702 creates a heavy default rule that
emails and their ilk are indescendible. To escape the statute's strong
gravitational pull, a fiduciary must show that a decedent actively
agreed to convey her digital assets. And even that may not be enough
if the ISP's TOS denies the power of posthumous transfer.

39. Benderson Dev. Co. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 998 F.2d 959, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("To breach
a contract is not unlawful; the breach only begets a remedy in law or in equity."); cf In re Am.
Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 560-61 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that an
airline did not violate § 2702 by disclosing customers' information even though doing so may
have violated its own privacy policy).
40. Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 303 P.3d 147, 150 (Colo. App. 2013) (quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 37, at 965).
41. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 861 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (describing
violations of service agreements and criminal sanctions that could occur and a lack of public
awareness).
42. For instance, the statute carves out "[e]xceptions for disclosure" in which '[a]
provider . . . may divulge the contents of a communication." § 2702(b) (emphasis added).
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III. THE FADA
The FADA makes digital assets presumptively inheritable. 43
The draft statute provides that fiduciaries are authorized users under
section 2701 and "have the lawful consent of the account holder" for
the purposes of section 2702.44 In addition, unlike section 2702's
regime of permissive disclosure, the FADA requires ISPs to divulge
stored data to fiduciaries who have a decedent's blessing.4 5 The FADA
also takes a somewhat dim view of clauses in TOS that prohibit
fiduciary access, invalidating them unless they are separately
signed.4 6 And finally, the FADA permits privacy-conscious testators to
override the default and declare in their wills that their electronic
property is indescendible.47
To see why these are sensible reforms, it is helpful to step back
and examine the law's traditionally blunt policy toward inheritability.
Generally, if you own something at death, you must convey it to
someone else.4 8 However, a small group of assets defies the irresistible
magnetism of inheritance. Consider human body parts, which can be
worth hundreds of thousands of dollars but cannot be transmitted by
will, trust, or intestacy.4 9 There are several rationales for this
prohibition, but the critical one for my purposes is that some owners
would want to exclude their biological material from their estate.
Indeed, although many individuals would welcome the opportunity to

43.
On its face, the draft statute accomplishes the more modest goal of facilitating fiduciary
access without "vary[ing] the underlying laws of management, descent, and distribution that
otherwise apply to all assets and property." Suzanne B. Walsh, Coming Soon to a Legislature
Near You: Comprehensive State Law Governing Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets, 8
CHARLESTON L. REV. 429, 441-42 (2014). Yet I do not see a sharp distinction between allowing
fiduciaries to control digital property and making digital property prima facie descendible.
Assets are inheritable unless there is a roadblock like the SCA. Taking the SCA out of the
equation thus places the onus on decedents to opt out of descendibility, either in their
testamentary instruments or through TOS.
44. See FADA § 8(a)(2)-(3). As Professor Cahn notes, whether states have the power to
define "authorization" and "lawful consent" within the meaning of the SCA raises a thorny
preemption issue. See Cahn, supra note 1, at 1723-25 (noting that existing state laws and the
UFADA expressly allow fiduciary access and define "lawful consent," causing a potential conflict
with federal law).
45.
See FADA § 9 (stating the procedures the government must follow to compel disclosure
from ISPs).
46. Id. at § 8(b)-(c).
47.
See id. at § 4 (giving fiduciaries authority over digital property "[u]nless prohibited by
the will of a decedent").
48. See Horton, supra note 22, at 548-49 ("[O]wning an item confers the power to transfer
it when one dies.").
49. See id. at 552-57 (noting that a deceased cannot leave her cadaver to her loved ones
upon death).
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expand the size of their legacies, others would object to the harvesting
and sale of their organs on moral or ethical grounds. Accordingly, as I
have discussed elsewhere, if policymakers decided to make human
tissues descendible, they would also need to create a unique rule
permitting owners to opt out.50
Similarly, not everyone would want to convey their electronic
assets to others after death. Of course, the Internet has become a rich
repository of memories, overflowing with pictures and conversations.
Many people would gladly entrust this colorful digital scrapbook to
future generations. Likewise, in this era of online banking and bill
payment, it can be difficult to perform the nuts and bolts of estate
administration without access to a decedent's in-box. Nevertheless,
treating online belongings like all other property would raise grave
privacy concerns. After all, "[e]ach of us can think of at least one email that we would not want to fall into the wrong hands."5 1 Indeed,
there are numerous anecdotes of family members unearthing material
that no decedent would want exposed. 52 As a mother remarked after
discovering her deceased daughter's secret blog, "[s]he had passwords
for a reason."53
Thus, digital assets should neither be completely descendible
nor fully indescendible. Instead, the law should encourage users to
make their posthumous wishes known on an account-by-account basis.
The SCA does not accomplish this goal. For one, the statute
has the potential to thwart a decedent's intent. Recall that section
2702 may allow nontransferability provisions in TOS to override a
testator or settlor's unambiguous attempt to bequeath digital assets.
Only customers who sign up for the rare ISP that allows disclosure
can be sure that their loved ones will receive their online belongings.
This privileging of fine print over the commands of a decedent's will or
trust is exactly backwards.
Moreover, the SCA gets the pivotal policy question-the choice
of gap-filler-wrong. People often die without expressing their
testamentary desires about digital assets. This makes the choice of
default rule tremendously important. Should we adhere to the SCA
and deem electronic property to be presumptively indescendible? Or

50. See id. at 587-88 (stating that an "all-out" descendibility with no opt-out provision
would be unfair).

51.

Justin Atwater, Who Owns E-mail? Do You Have the Right to Decide the Disposition of

Your PrivateDigitalLife?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 397, 399.
52. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 3 (explaining that the decedent may not have wanted her
personal information discovered).
53. Id. The blog was entitled "you wouldn't want to know." Id.
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should we follow the FADA and make online belongings inheritable
unless an owner tells us otherwise?
For several reasons, the FADA's approach is superior. First, as
noted above, almost all property is descendible. Because emails and
pictures embody a user's labor and ingenuity-two hallmarks of
ownership-54 most users probably believe that the same principle
governs their online possessions. In turn, this makes a default rule of
inheritability consistent with majoritarian expectations. Second, in
other contexts, the values that the SCA safeguards during life
dissipate upon death. Indeed, a personal representative cannot sue for
posthumous invasion of a decedent's privacy or reputation." It would
therefore be anomalous to give the dead robust legal protections
against embarrassment and other dignitary harms. And finally,
societal interests tip the scales toward making electronic property
generally inheritable. It would be tragic if "digital artifacts" died along
with their creators, rather than leaving a vivid residue of life in the
twenty-first century.56
IV. CONCLUSION

Professor Cahn's thoughtful Symposium piece fortifies her
reputation as the leading scholar on digital inheritance. Although I
interpret the SCA slightly differently, I agree that the FADA
constitutes a huge upgrade from an outmoded federal law that was
never meant to bully its way into the field of decedents' estates.

54. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 21, at 567 ("Individuals often feel that the effort they have
sunk into these things entitles them to the full panoply of property-style privileges.").
55. See, e.g., id. at 560 (explaining there is no cause of action for slander or libel of a dead
person).
56. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai, Property,Persona,and Preservation,81 TEMP. L. REV. 67, 8993 (2008) ("Historians require access to primary sources to gain insight into how society has
evolved.").

